The Black Prince Read online

  Significantly, in view of the increasingly hostile relations with France that were about to develop into open war, Edward III chose at this time to further reward some of those that had supported him in the 1330 coup and in his reign up to that point. He aimed to secure and establish a significant section of the nobility to aid him in the military action that lay ahead. His son, not yet seven years of age, would in time be the mainstay of that effort, and the king wished to distinguish him from others within the peerage; thus the earldom of Cornwall became a duchy. At the same time, six other titles were granted to the upper echelons of the aristocracy. Henry of Grosmont became earl of Derby, William Montague received the earldom of Salisbury, William Clinton that of Huntingdon, Robert Ufford, Suffolk, William Bohun, Northampton, and Hugh Audeley, Gloucester. Such men were to be intimately involved with the war effort and a number were closely acquainted with the prince as well as his father.

  By this time, the die in the Anglo-French ‘game’ had been cast and the significant issue lay not in Gascony, but Scotland. The king had begun campaigning there soon after the birth of his first son. On 12 August 1332, he was victorious at Dupplin Moor, thereby establishing Edward Balliol as king, who acknowledged Edward III as his liege. Balliol’s deposition by David Bruce resulted in a second expedition in which the king defeated the Scots at Halidon Hill on 19 July 1333. He went on to take Berwick, and by 1336 he had established control over much of the lowlands including the fortresses of Roxburgh, Edinburgh, Perth and Stirling. As a result of this, in 1334, David Bruce had arrived as an exile in France and thereafter, Philip VI declared that Scotland had to be included in any Gascon settlement. Just as the duchy was a thorn in the flesh of the French monarchy, so was Scotland in England’s, and the questionable feudal relationship that had existed since 1259 was put under greater pressure than it could stand with French interference in the domestic affairs of the king of England.

  The confiscation of Gascony had happened on several occasions since the Treaty of Paris, but the conditions were such in 1337 that the outcome was not a relatively brief fracas but a conflict that would continue for at least 116 years. The ‘final straw’ was the banishment of Robert of Artois and his exile in the English court. To shelter an outlaw such as Robert breached Edward’s duty as a vassal of the French king. On 24 May 1337, Gascony and Ponthieu were ordered to be seized, and although military action did not break out until 1339, England and France were at war.

  The English approach to the conflict took a familiar pattern, one focussed on Flanders (after the Francophile Louis of Nevers was all but replaced by Jacob van Artevelde in 1337–8) and using large numbers of foreign mercenaries. An alliance, negotiated by the earls of Salisbury and Huntingdon and Henry Burghersh, bishop of Lincoln, was formed with Louis of Bavaria, the king’s brother-in-law, but even the ambassadors were not convinced of the wisdom of such a course, fearing that ‘the king would not be able to bear the expense of the conditions which they demanded’.10 Additional treaties were made with William of Avesnes, count of Hainault and a number of other princes of the Low Countries including the count of Guelders, the marquis of Juliers and the duke of Brabant. Edward III set sail on 16 July 1338, landing at Antwerp six days later. The intention was to recover the castles of the Cambrésis, but the relationship between the allies was uneasy from the outset. The princes were unwilling to commit their forces until they had been paid in full, and with their inactivity the wage bill rose. That bill was additional to the initial fees, which in total exceeded £160,000. To cover such expenses, Edward borrowed £70,000 from the Italian banks, the Bardi and Peruzzi; mortgaged his crown as well as gold and jewellery, and acquired loans from the wool merchant William de la Pole and others, some at rates of 50 per cent interest. The pressure on England in the form of taxation and purveyance grew as the autumn turned into winter, with nothing to show for the expenditure.11

  While Edward’s allies were prevaricating, Philip ofValois took the opportunity to launch a number of naval raids on English territories in the Channel Islands, and military pressure increased on Gascony with the loss of Blaye and Bourg in April 1339. In England, parliamentary discontent grew from February and there was further concern as a result of French and Genoese raids, initially on the south-west of England and into the Bristol Channel, and then towards Plymouth and the Isle of Wight. They were repelled when trying to land at Dover and Folkestone, but burned Hastings. Coastal defences were a further expense and the king was completely incapable of honouring his payments to Louis of Bavaria and his other allies. Edward seems not to have been aware of the gravity of the situation, or rather he attributed it to corruption and mismanagement within his own government.

  Edward eventually cajoled his allies into an expedition and left Brussels early in September 1339. The attack on Cambrai began sometime after 20 September, but Philip VI made no attempt to try to relieve the city and the assault failed. The domestic political repercussions were considerable and marked, for the first time, a parliamentary grant that was conditional upon certain reforms, including the establishment of a committee to control government expenditure. This was hardly surprising, as the campaign of 1339–40 cost some £386,465.12

  It is extremely significant that although hostilities between England and France began formally in 1337, Edward did not claim the throne of France until 1340. The motivation, at this point, seems clear:

  Finally, having considered and thought over everything, and weighed the good against the bad, he [Edward III] did take the arms of France, quartered with those of England, and from then on he styled himself King of France and England, and did everything that the Flemings asked of him, and as King of France, quit them of any obligation they had to the King of France; and from this point the Flemings continued to aid him during the rule of Jacques van Artevelde.13

  Thus, Edward’s claim to the French throne, at least in the opinion of Jean Le Bel, the chronicler from Hainault and precursor of Froissart, was to secure the support of the Flemish.

  The quartering of the French with the English arms and the arrogation of the fleur de lys was one of the most powerful demonstrations of Edward’s claim to the throne of France. Initially, the arms were quartered with the English device foremost, but this was altered in line with Edward’s dynastic pretensions in 1340, placing the fleurs in the paternal position. By 1348, coins were minted using solely the French arms, and despite informally giving up his claim in 1360, Edward retained the arms.14

  The first notable English success in the war with France was at sea, in a battle fought at the mouth of the River Zwyn. The Black Prince was only ten years of age on 24 June 1340, so took no part in the battle of Sluys, yet it was significant in the development of his military career and marked one of few early successes for the English in the Hundred Years War. Several of those who would become part of his household and military retinue did fight, and it was in the context of this encounter that Nigel Loryng, who was to become one of the prince’s closest advisors and valued servants, was knighted. Indeed, it was at Sluys that the experiences of the Scottish campaigns, of the victories at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill, were put to good use in the war with France.15 Despite it being a naval battle, the characteristics of the victory would become familiar; a larger French force was defeated by superior tactics and a more effective use of the conditions. The victories at Crécy and Poitiers would be based on such experience.

  The victory at Sluys prevented a potential French invasion of England but it was not supported or followed by effective military action on land. Edward’s inability to pay his allies caused them to abandon him, and he was forced to come to terms with the French, signing a truce at Espléchin, near Tournai, on 25 September 1340.

  Edward III, unable to take advantage of the situation in France, took revenge for his failure at home. John Stratford, the archbishop of Canterbury, in particular was held responsible for the lack of funds that had prevented success in the campaign in Flanders. But the king realised that he
could not buy allies, at least not with money; future campaigns would rely primarily on Anglo-Welsh and Gascon troops, and political support would be sought from those that had something personal to gain from siding with England in the Hundred Years War.

  As Scotland, Flanders and Gascony had encouraged and catalysed the Hundred Years War, so conflicts in other areas would continue to fan the flames. The outbreak of civil war in Brittany between Charles de Blois and Jean de Montfort brought that struggle within the Plantagenet-Valois conflict. The English supported Montfort and close links were to develop between the prince and Jean, particularly after 1362. Montfort accompanied the prince on his tournée d’hommages of the new principality of Aquitaine, and this may have brought Jean into contact with John Chandos who became the leader of Montfort’s forces at the battle of Auray in 1364. The prince had attempted to resolve the succession crisis bringing the parties together on two occasions at Poitiers in 1363–4; when this failed direct military assistance was offered to Montfort. Chandos was not the only member of the prince’s retinue to fight alongside Montfort at Auray and elsewhere. Links with Brittany were further strengthened by the marriage of Joan Holland, the prince’s stepdaughter, to Jean on 26 March 1366.16 The association is vividly apparent in the seemingly unlikely setting of St Margaret’s church, King’s Lynn, where the arms of the Black Prince and those of Montfort flank a stylised image of a face, presumably Edward III on a misericord. Both the prince and later Montfort had associations with the Norfolk port through rights to the tollbooth and the nearby estate at Castle Rising. The county and surrounding area was a surprisingly rich recruitment area for the prince despite his limited tenurial interests there (see figs 12, 13, 18, 21, 22 for examples of other East Anglians among the prince’s entourage). A number of the East Anglian knightly community would become retainers on the occasion of the prince’s military baptism in 1346 and thereafter. Throughout his career, the prince’s retinue was in a constant state of flux and evolution and this began at an early stage. The grant of the principality of Wales in 1343 further galvanised Edward’s administration and the development of his household. A wardrobe account of 1344–5 reveals a number of significant retainers who would rise to high office within the retinue, and in some cases the nation. Amongst these were John Dabernon (from 1347 keeper of the prince’s fees in Devon and Cornwall), Ivo Glinton (keeper of the great seal), Nicholas Pinnock (auditor), Peter Gildesburgh, Robert Stretton, William Shareshull, and Richard Stafford (member of the prince’s council from 1343, knight bachelor of the household).17 Alongside the governing officials, Wales was to provide the bulk of the troops for the prince’s first military campaign and his personal retinue began to take shape in the preparations for the 1346 expedition when the prince took his first role on the international stage.

  3

  War, Plague and Chivalry (1346–54)

  ‘Let the Boy Win His Spurs’: Crécy and Calais

  The reign of Edward III has often and continues to be described in glowing terms (if only until 1369) but before 1346 he had achieved little, at least in France. The policy of alliances had brought England to the verge of bankruptcy, and the king had only narrowly avoided a major political crisis in 1340–1. The campaign of 1346 was, in some respects, a ‘last throw of the dice’; the victory at Crécy was needed to preserve Edward’s continental ambitions, reputation and the support of the country, particularly in parliament.

  The failure of the 1344 peace talks at Avignon resulted in a hardening of both French and English positions regarding Gascony. King Philip appointed the dauphin, Jean, duke of Guienne, and at about the same time, Henry of Grosmont and the earl of Arundel were despatched to the duchy as Edward III’s lieutenants. Grosmont returned in 1345 with an army and as sole lieutenant. Further forces were sent to Brittany under the command of Northampton, and the king and the Black Prince set sail for Flanders. Certain key members of the prince’s household accompanied him, including Edmund Wauncy (household steward and bachelor, member of the council), Richard de la Bere, Roland Daneys and Guillaume St Omer. The intention was to reopen hostilities with raids from Flanders, but this was scuppered by the assassination of Jacob van Artevelde. The king returned and plans were afoot for an expedition to France by 29 September when commissions of array of Welsh troops were ordered.1

  In the development of the plan for the 1346 Normandy operation, the role of Godfrey de Harcourt was central.2 Harcourt had been knighted in 1326 and became lord of Saint-Sauveur-le-Victomte in the Cotentin four years later. This was one of the strongest fortresses in western Normandy. He came into conflict with another Norman noble, Guillaume Bertran, over the marriage of Jeanette Bacon, one of the wealthiest heiresses in the province. Hostilities broke out: the king and parlement sided with Bertran and condemned Harcourt who sought refuge in London, and as Robert of Artois had done in 1336, gave homage to Edward III.3

  The war had not been a success thus far; a different approach was needed to stave off political opposition at home and secure a victory abroad, one secured at a cost that parliament would accept. The failure at Tournai (1340) and the subsequent truce of Espléchin necessitated a change of English strategy that was both political and military. The crushing expense of the foreign alliances were set aside in favour of predominantly English and Welsh troops, and the king sought to implement the strategy that had seen so much success in Scotland. In the course of the first French campaign, he ‘had found himself helpless against an enemy who concentrated on defensive tactics and refused to be brought to battle’. The target of this new assault was greatly influenced by Harcourt, whose own interests led him to encourage Edward to attack Normandy. This also had the advantage of being the closest landfall to Portsmouth and there the coast was virtually undefended. There were further advantages that the Norman emphasised, such as the wealth of the region and the advantage that could be gained through the use of his personal knowledge of the area.

  There were strict attempts to maintain secrecy prior to and during the operation of 1346, but the scale of preparations was such that the timetable became almost common knowledge. However, the French did not know, at least until very late in the day, the destination of the fleet, which was altered on a number of occasions and probably not revealed to any but the king’s closest confidants. Adverse winds may also have altered the intended destination; consequently, French defensive preparations were inadequate. The Flemish alliance and a commission given to Sir Hugh Hastings [see figs 12, 13] in June shows that a landing in northern France had already been considered as an option if only to divert French forces from the duchy. On 20 June, Hastings, who had recently returned from Gascony, was appointed the king’s lieutenant and commander in Flanders and Brittany. Hastings, John Moleyns, John Mautravers and perhaps John Montgommery led a force of 230 archers and a few men-at-arms while several Flemish towns provided additional troops.4

  In 1346, the prince had his first real taste of the military life and he was suitably prepared and equipped for the experience. His personal retinue included 11 bannerets, 102 knights bachelor, 264 men-at-arms/esquires, 384 horsed archers and 582 on foot, a total of 1,343 soldiers. However, some of these may have been drafted in for the subsequent siege of Calais, the loss of the pay accounts for the expedition makes the reconstruction of the army problematic.5 The primary recruiting area for the bulk of the army was Wales, which was to provide some 7,000 soldiers, half from the principality and half from the Marches, and a further 100 archers were brought in from Cheshire.

  There were fears that in the course of the expedition, a reciprocal invasion might be launched and so, on 26 July, watches were ordered to be set in Flint and North Wales for French and, remarkably, Turkish ships. The Turkish ‘threat’ may have simply been another element in the king’s propaganda campaign, emphasising the danger of invasion in order to demonstrate the defensive nature of the war and to propose that there was an alliance between the French and the heathen Turks. It is quite an extraordinary statement considerin
g that the ‘Sarazins’ did not acquire a European base until 1354.6 However, the fear of a French invasion was not unfounded as plans found at Caen proved, suggesting that a force of 4,000 men-at-arms, 5,000 foot and 5,000 crossbowmen would be mustered for an attack on England. It was in the king’s interest to exaggerate the threat of invasion in order to ensure continuing revenue from taxation, which, in theory, would be provided only for a war fought in self-defence.7

  The main attack was preceded by small incursions in other regions. In addition to Hastings’ expedition, Thomas Dagworth rode against the French-allied claimant to Brittany and defeated Charles de Blois on 9 June 1346 near Saint-Pol de Leon. Richard Totesham, with the garrison from La Roche-Derrien, raided and sacked Lannion.8 At Aiguillon, small groups of English and Gascon troops commanded by Lancaster managed to infiltrate and seize the town. Lancaster’s deputy was Walter Mauny and the troops included Ralph Stafford, then the keeper of the prince’s estates, as well as Nigel Loryng and perhaps Richard Stafford. They were then themselves besieged. This may have been the event, compounded by the influence of Godfrey de Harcourt, which decided Edward on invading the Cotentin peninsula.9 Harcourt’s involvement indicates that the original plan may have been to attempt some sort of occupation of Normandy and perhaps what began as a campaign of conquest became a chevauchée.10

  The army landed at La Hougue on 12 July 1346. Disembarkation was an extended process lengthened by the necessity to rest the horses after the long crossing. In that time, the king took the opportunity to recoup some of the costs of the campaign and mark its beginning by knighting his eldest son and a number of others. The occasion traditionally allowed a tax to be levied.